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Testimony before to Congress in November 2011 and at
the Sentencing Commission’s February 2012 hearing on
Federal Sentencing Options after Booker presented two
sharply contrasting views.
In Congressional testimony in November of 2011,
the Commission’s chair, Judge Patti Saris, advocated
legislative changes to (1) require district courts to give
“substantial weight” to the Guidelines, (2) require greater
justifications for greater variances, (3) apply a more robust
standard for appellate review, and (4) apply a heightened
standard for review of sentencing decisions based upon
policy disagreements with the Guidelines.1 Several witnesses at the Commission’s follow-up hearing, including
Judge (and former Commissioner) William Sessions2 and
Professor Frank Bowman,3 also called for significant
changes in the Guidelines system. Indeed, the structure of
the Commission’s hearing—which included a panel on
Restoring Mandatory Guidelines4—signaled its interest in
such changes. The need for a “Booker fix” rests predominantly (though not exclusively) on the perception of what
Judge Saris characterized as “troubling trends in sentencing,” meaning declining rates of within-Guidelines
sentences and the perception that unwarranted disparity
is increasing.
In contrast, however, many other witnesses (myself
included) testified that the system is working reasonably
well, and they opposed any fundamental legislative
changes, particularly those intended to make the system
more binding or mandatory.5 Some of the witnesses who
supported the current advisory Guidelines system urged
other changes, particularly the elimination of mandatory
minimum sentences and reductions in sentencing
severity.6
In this brief essay, I explain my view that the Commission’s data do not show a “troubling” level of variances
and provide no justification for significant legislation
changes to reduce judicial discretion and make the federal
Guidelines more binding or mandatory.
I.

First Principles

Proponents of change bear the burden of persuasion. That
is true as a general matter, and much more so in the case
of such a large and complex system.

Section 3553(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act is the
benchmark for evaluating the current sentencing statistics. It begins with a key admonition that courts “shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the statutory purposes of
sentencing.7 This parsimony principle is more, not less,
important in 2012 than it was at the time of its enactment
in 1984, because of two well-known factors: the very substantial increase in the size of the federal prison
population, and the pressing need to reduce the federal
budget deficit.
This is not merely a matter of our concern for the individuals who might serve a term of imprisonment
exceeding what the statute requires. In their testimony
both Associate Deputy Attorney General Matthew Axelrod8
and Professor Frank Bowman9 rightly called attention to
tradeoffs within the criminal justice budget: dollars spent
on the Bureau of Prisons are not available for the investigation and enforcement of new criminal activity. Public
safety is and should remain a concern, and excessive use of
incarceration does not promote public safety.
II. What does unwarranted disparity mean?

In considering whether changes are necessary to respond
to increasing disparity in the federal system in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,10
it is important to consider together two elements of the
statutory directive in § 3553(a).
•

Subsection 3553(a)(6) provides that in imposing
sentences the courts shall consider “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.”

•

However, that provision cannot be considered in
isolation. Indeed, Section 3553(a) begins with the
admonition in subsection (1) that the court “shall
consider . . . the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.”

Read together these provisions demonstrate that a difference in the sentence for two individuals is not an
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unjustified disparity if it reflects a difference in the circumstances of the offense, the criminal history of the
defendants, or “the characteristics of the defendant.”
A. Individual characteristics may warrant different
sentences.

Two recent cases in the United States Supreme Court,
Gall v. United States11 and Pepper v. United States,12 illustrate that not all differences in sentences are unjustified.
As a college student, Brian Gall was using drugs when
he joined an ongoing drug conspiracy and delivered
ecstasy pills. Within months, however, he stopped using
drugs, voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy, graduated from college, and obtained work in the construction
industry, eventually becoming a master carpenter. When
federal investigators later approached him, he admitted
his limited participation. After release on his own recognizance, Gall started a construction business netting profits
of more than $2,000 per month. Applying the § 3553(a)
factors and noting that Gall had withdrawn from the conspiracy, had used no drugs since college, and was
“self‑rehabilitated,” the district judge sentenced Gall to
probation. In considering these factors, the district judge
did not create an unwarranted disparity between Gall and
other offenders. To the contrary, the disparity was warranted. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court held that
“[o]n abuse‑of‑discretion review, the Court of Appeals
should have given due deference to the District Court’s
reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on the whole, justified the sentence.”13
In the Supreme Court, Jason Pepper’s case involved
the issue, not relevant here, of the propriety of considering post-rehabilitative resentencing. For my purposes,
the main point is how much Jason Pepper, like Brian
Gall, differed from most offenders sentenced for similar
offenses. By the time of his resentencing on drug
charges, Pepper was no longer a drug addict, was
enrolled in community college, had achieved very good
grades, was working part time, and was slated for a promotion. He was married and supporting a family, and
had also reestablished relationships with his father. His
probation officer testified that in light of his substantial
assistance and rehabilitation, Pepper posed a very low
risk of reoffending. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) the sentencing court was not merely permitted, but required to
consider these factors. Given Pepper’s characteristics
and the statutory directive to impose a sentence not
greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes
of sentencing, it was entirely appropriate for the district
court to sentence him very substantially below the Guidelines range. Thus the difference between Pepper’s
sentence and that of other defendants whose conduct
involved the same quantity of drugs is not an unjustified
disparity. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to
require that he be imprisoned for as long as another
offender who had neither conquered his addiction nor
demonstrated such exemplary rehabilitation.

These cases illustrate how critical it is not to equate all
sentences below the Guidelines range with unwarranted
and “troubling” disparity. Below-Guidelines sentences
may be fully in accordance with both the mandate of the
parsimony principle as well as the statutory requirement
that the district courts consider the offender’s characteristics. Advocates of changes that would make the federal
system more binding, moving it closer to a mandatory system, typically emphasize the increasing percentage of
below-Guidelines sentences not sponsored by the Government. This argument assumes that these variances and
departures are unwarranted in some, most, or all of the
individual cases.14 That assumption, however, is not consistent with the statutory directives.
One of the changes proposed by Judge Saris on behalf
of the Commission would work an important, and undesirable, change on this very point. In her Congressional
testimony in October 2011, Judge Saris suggested that the
language of § 3553(a)(1) should be modified to eliminate
the reference to offender characteristics in the sentencing
of individual defendants.15 Gall, Pepper, and many other
cases demonstrate the importance of consideration of
offender characteristics in individual cases.
B. Sentencing Discretion and Differences
in Prosecutorial Charging and Bargaining

The additional flexibility provided to the district courts as a
result of the Booker decision also provided these courts
with an enhanced ability to achieve greater consistency
(rather than disparity) by offsetting variances in prosecutorial practices.16
The Commission’s data have consistently shown significant differences from district to district, which were
present both before and after the Booker decision. As Professor Michael Tonry noted in his prepared testimony,
sentencing regimes in the U.S. (as elsewhere) will exhibit
natural regional variations.17 What Professor Tonry did not
emphasize is how much of the variation from district to
district has been and continues to be the result of differences in the policies and practices of the U.S. Attorney’s
Offices, particularly with regard to the prevalence and
standards for downward departures for substantial assistance. In 2010, the rate of government-sponsored
downward departures for substantial assistance in six profiled districts ranged from a low of 2.8 percent to a high of
32 percent.18 Equally important, this variation in prosecutorial practices existed both before and after Booker, with
the same districts having very low or high rates of substantial assistance departures.19
Additionally, the Commission’s mandatory minimum
studies have revealed long-standing practices that may create disparity. The Commission’s 2011 report to Congress
on mandatory minimums documented that inconsistent
charging and plea practices among districts resulted in the
disparate application of mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions.20 Similarly, in 1995, the Commission found
that less than half of defendants eligible for mandatory
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sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were sentenced
under that provision. No charges under § 924(c) were ever
filed in a significant number of eligible cases, and in many
other cases the § 924(c) charges were bargained away in
plea negotiations.21
A new working paper describing a study by Professors
Sonja Starr and Marit Rehavi highlights how critical it
may be to study the effect of charging decisions and to
maintain judicial flexibility.22 Their working paper reports
their conclusion that black arrestees, especially black
males, face significantly more severe charges conditional
on the offense for which they are arrested and other
observed characteristics. They find that the disparity in the
use of charges that carry mandatory minimum sentences
is “particularly striking,” and disparities arising from
charging decisions “appear to be major drivers of sentencing disparity.”23 Accordingly, they suggest that “if
policymakers are serious about reducing racial disparity in
sentencing, a substantial portion of their focus should be
on the role of prosecutorial discretion, including the application of mandatory minimum sentences.”24 Although
this is merely a working paper, it shows the potential
impact of charging decisions, as well as the wisdom of
preserving judicial flexibility.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are not made transparently and are not subject to judicial review. It seems
unwise to focus on reducing judicial discretion—but not
disparities in prosecutorial practices—when doing so may
deprive the courts of a tool to respond to prosecutorial
practices and promote true sentencing uniformity.
C.

Conclusions about Disparity

These general observations lead me to two conclusions.
First, the data do not show unwarranted sentencing disparity (though there are significant problems with a few
particular Guidelines, some of which are under review by
the Commission). In my view, these data are not sufficient
to meet the burden of demonstrating the need for fundamental change. Although the system that has evolved
since Booker is not perfect, the district courts now have the
flexibility to respond in individual cases to excessively (or
insufficiently) severe sentences that do not serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. Second, it is unclear whether
any of the proposed changes would achieve the goal of
reducing unwarranted disparity. Reducing downward
departures and variances might actually increase true disparity by eliminating judicial flexibility to take into
account critical offender characteristics and to offset differences in prosecutorial practices and policies.
What if the Commission or other groups produce more
refined data showing increases in regional and inter-judge
disparity?25 What should we do if judges in some regions,
or individual judges on some courts, are consistently more
willing than others to sentence below the Guidelines when
there are factors that might support such a sentence under
§ 3553(a)? In considering whether statutory changes are warranted, we should recognize that there may be good reasons

384

for regional variations. Sentences within certain districts or
regions may reflect distinctive local conditions, including
prevalence of certain crimes, the charging practices of the
U.S. Attorneys, the federal caseload, and the availability of
state prosecutions.26 Such disparity is not unwarranted.
And we should also be wary of any cure that may be worse
than the disease. In this context, what critics call “disparity”
generally means an uneven distribution of sentences that
are below (not above) the applicable Guidelines range.
Unwarranted severity can produce sentencing disparity.27
I argue below that excessive sentence severity is a problem,
but not one that Congress is likely to solve, at least in the
near term. If I am right, reducing so-called disparity in this
context will mean increasing unwarranted severity.
III. Assessing Other Justifications for Change

The hardest question to answer is how to assess the proposals for fundamental change ably championed by Judge
Sessions,28 Professor Frank Bowman,29and the Constitution Project.30
To say that the current system is working fairly well is
not to say that it is ideal. I agree that we could in theory
have a much better—or even an ideal—system. My wish
list for a new or improved sentencing regime would
include:
•

recalibration to lower sentences, because the present system generates unnecessarily severe
sentences that impose great costs on society as well
as individual offenders, their families, and communities;

•

simplification, because the present system is
unduly complex, making it more costly and more
prone to error;

•

enhanced reliability of fact-finding on key factual
issues;

•

preservation of judicial flexibility, which might
include but would not be limited to broader sentencing ranges;

•

insulation from Congressional micro-management;
and

•

correction of structural problems, such as the fact
that the Sentencing Commission is not subject to
the rule-making procedures and appellate review
under the Administrative Procedure Act.31

The question, however, is not whether one can imagine a
better system, but whether now is the time to initiate the
process for fundamental change and redesign of the federal sentencing system.
There is no present agreement on the key goals or elements of change. As noted, some advocates of change seek
a system that is mandatory (or as close to mandatory as
constitutionally possible without jury findings). Others,
however, have very different goals, giving a high priority to
bringing sentencing levels down, simplifying the system,
and preserving judicial flexibility.
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The choice among those alternatives would not be
made by the Sentencing Commission and the witnesses
who testified before it, or by the specialists who read the
Federal Sentencing Reporter. Any changes of this nature
would necessarily require Congressional action.
Congress is—and is intended to be—a political, nonexpert, lay body. It does not approach sentencing from the
perspective of those who work in the system day to day,
seeing the individual cases like Gall and Pepper, nor from
an academic perspective. Its views of needed and desirable
change in the past twenty years have focused on two elements: harsher sentences and less judicial discretion.32
These themes have been popular with the public.
What basis do we have for thinking this dynamic will
change? Why should we think that the views of the Commission or experts will be more persuasive in Congress now?
Two time-worn adages contain wisdom that seems very
much on point here. The first is the old trial lawyers’
adage that you should never ask a witness a question if
you don’t already know the answer. There’s a rough parallel here. We should not ask Congress for fundamental
reform of the sentencing process if we don’t know what
answer it might give to the question how the system
should change. The second adage is often attributed to
Voltaire: the perfect is the enemy of the good. The witnesses who cautioned the Sentencing Commission
against change have concluded that the present system,
though far from perfect, is pretty good. That is especially
so when contrasted with a system that combines inflexibility with excessive severity.
I agree.
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